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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
of the United States, they are, under
that sub-clause, constitutional and opera-
tire. Under that sub-clause the State is
made the primary judge whether the
imposts and duties, so laid, are necessary
"br the execution of its inspection laws.
It is prevented from using this power for
any other purpose by the declaration, in
the sub-clause referred to, that the net
produce of all duties, or imposts, laid by
it, shall he for the use of the treasury
of the United States ; and by the further
sufficient provision that all laws, laying
such imposts, shall be subject to the
revision and control of Congress. It
would seem, under the particular sub-
clause, that a State law, which is, in
fact, an inspection law, and which im-
poses h duty on imports, or exports, for
the purpose of executing the inspection
laws of such State, is subject only to two
restrictions, viz. : the right of the United
States to receive the net produce of such
duties, or imposts, and to the power
of Congress to revise and control the
law imposing such duties, or imposts:
Baldwin's Coust. Views 189.
Such duties are of course regulations
of commerce, but they are regulations in-
cidentally made by a State in relation to
a product of its own soil, by means of
inspection laws, which such State has
authority to execute within its own ter-
ritory, under the express and implied
terms of art. 1, sect. 10, sub-clause 2,
of the Federal Constitution. It is scarcely
necessary to call the charges which accrue
in the execution of the inspection laws
of a State duties. They are, ordinarily,
simply a compensation for services pro-
perly rendered : Pace v. Burgess, Col-
lector, 92 U. S. S75, 376 ; Packet Co. v.
Keokuk, 95 Id. 84, 86-89 ; Paket Co.
v. St. Louis, 100 Id. 429, 430; ficks-
burg v. Tobin, Id. 432, 433.
It may be true, that the imposition
of such charges has a remote and con-
siderable influence on commerce. The
charges are not objectionable on that
account: State Tax on Railway Gross
Receipts, 15 Wall. 293 ; Sherlock v. Al-
ling, 93 U. S. 103, 104. They are pro-
per charges, because they are made for
the purpose of fitting an article for ex-
portation, while it remains in the bosom
of the State which produced it: Gibbons
v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 203; License Cases,
5 How. 577 ; Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S.
488; Foster v. New Orleans, 94 Id.
248. C. J. I. Gwncn.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.'
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA. 2
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. 3
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
4
SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE. 5
ACTION.
Agent-Right to sue in own Name-Landlord and Tenant-A party
entering into a contract in his own name may sue or be sued upon it,
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1882. The cases will probably appear in 16 Otto.
2 From J. H. Lumpkin, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 65 or 66 Georgia Rep.
3 From John Lathrop, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 133 Mass. Reports.
' From E. L. Dewitt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 38 or 39 Ohio St. Reports.
s From Hon. Benjamin 3. Lea, Reporter; to appear in 10 Lea.
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whether he be in fact agent or principal: Davis v. Harness, 38 or 39
Ohio St.
Where a landlord, with the consent of his tenants, sold their share
of a crop of corn with his own, and afterward brought an action against
the purchaser for not accepting the corn, the fact that the landlord did
not own all the corn, neither constitutes a defence nor operates to
diminish the damages. If the acceptance of the corn by the purchaser
would have invested him with a good title, it is not material whether
the landlord owned all the corn or not: Id.
When not Local-Bill to enjoin Trespass.-A bill in equity to enjoin
a trespass upon realty by felling timber is not such a suit respecting the
title to land as must be brought in the county where the land lies. The
proper venue of such a case is the county of the residence of a defend-
ant against whom substantial relief is prayed: Powell v. Cheshire, 65
or 66 Ga.
AGENT. See Action; Bills and .Notes.
ARBITRATION.
Award-Avoidance-D runkenness.-An award based upon statements
made by each party will not be set aside upon bill filed by one party
alleging that he was drunk at the time the reference and statement were
made, where the proof shows that he, though in liquor, was capable of
acting intelligently: O'Neil v. Rodgers, 10 Lea.
ASSIGNMENT.
For benefit of a-editors signing within limited Time-Failure to sign
through Accident.-Two debtors made an assignment of all their property
in trust, for the security of new notes to be given by them to such of
their creditors as should become parties to the assignment within two
months from the date thereof. By the terms of the assignment each
creditor was to yeceive'four new notes, payable at different times, the
last being payable in thirty months, and covenanted not to sue on his
original demand except on default in the payment of the new notes.
The trustees paid only a dividend on the new notes. After the last
of the new notes matured and one debtor had received a discharge in
bankruptcy and the other had ceased to be a resident of the common-
wealth, a creditor brought a bill in equity seeking to become a party to
the assignment. Held, that, although the trustees had funds sufficient
to pay him the same dividend which the creditors who signed had
received, and although he had accidentally failed to be a party to the
assignment, and would have been one had he known of it in time, the
bill could not be maintained: First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 133 Mass.
BILL OP SALE.
Signature by Mark-Absence of Witnesses.-Where one signs his
name to a bill of sale by making his mark, such bill of sale is not rendered
inadmissible, because there was no witness to the signature. If proved
genuine, such signature is good and binding: Larkin v. City of Darien,
65 or 66 Ga.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Presentment and Protest of Foreign Bill of Exchange-Notary's Seal
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-The presentment of a foreign bill of exchange is to be made within
the time allowed by the law of the place where the bill is payable, and
the protest thereof must be in accordance with that law. It appeared
in this case that the law of Norway allows a year for the presentment
of a bill at sight: Pierce v. Indseth, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
The court will take judicial notice of the seals of notaries public.
An impression directly on the paper by a die with which ink is used, is
hufficient: Id.
Signature as Agent.-The character of the liability of drawer of a
bill of exchange must be determined from the instrument itself; and the
addition of the word "agent" to his name, without anything else on the
instrument indicating his principal, does not relieve him from personal
liability as drawer of the bill: Ohio Nat. Bank v. Cook, 38 or 39 Ohio
St.
Consideration- Voluntary Release of Debt.-In an action on a pro-
missory note, it was alleged that the sole consideration of the note was
a debt to the payee, which he had voluntarily discharged: Held, it
appearing from the agreed statement of facts that the creditor had given
the debtor a " release" of the debt, the presumption arises that the
release was in such form as to operate as an extinguishment of the
obligation, in the absence of any showing as to the form of such release:
Carver v. Second Nat. Bank, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
A debt voluntarily released by the creditor is not sufficient consider-
ation to support a promise of the debtor to pay him the amount of such
debt: Id.
COMMON CARIER.
Responsibility beyond its own Terminus-Contract of Carriage a ques-
tion of General Law.-A common carrier receiving goods for transporta-
tion beyond its own line, in the absence of special contract, only imposes
on itself as to the transportation beyond its terminus, the duty of a
forwarder by the connecting line: Railroad Company v. lyrick, S. O.
U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
In this case the company's receipt stated the property to be "con-
signed" to parties beyond the terminus of the carrier issuing it; and,
after describing the property it added " for transportation * * * to the
warehouse at - ," leaving the place blank : on the margin wag
'*NoTcE.-See rules of transportation on the back hercof." The rules
referred to stated that the company would only act as forwarder beyond
its own line. On the margin of the receipt was a notice that it might
be "exchanged for a through bill of lading :" Held, that the receipt
did not constitute a through contract: Id.
What constitutes a contract of carriage is not a question of local law,
upon which the decision of a state court must control, but one of general
law. upon which the U. S. Supreme Court will exercise its own judgment:
Id.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See Common Carrier.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Pilotage.
CONTRACT.
Contract of Support-Breach of-Pleading.-If the breach of a con-
tract by one person to support another for his life is such that the latter
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may treat the contract as absolutely broken, and he so elects to treat it.
he may recover damages for the whole value of the contract : Parker
v. Russell, 133 Mass.
A declaration alleging that, in consideration of the conveyancc by the
plaintiff to the defeudant of certain real estate, the defendant agreed
to support the plaintiff during his life, and that the defendant accepted
the conveyance and occupied the estate, but refused and neglected to
perform his agreement, is sufficient to enable the plaintiff to recover
damages as for a total breach of the agreement: Id.
COPYRIGHT. See 1/unction.
(OaPORATION.
Right of Stockholder to sue to protect Property of Ooirporation.-
single stockholder can only sue to protect the property and rights of a
corporation after a refusal an.d neglect of the directors so to do, real and
persisted in, and which would lead to irremediable loss to him if he
were not permitted to bring the mattef before the courts: Oity of
Detroit v. -Dean, S, 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
VPolunteer Fire company-Death of Member-Distibution of Assets.-
A volunteer fire company was chartered by act of the legislature. Its
officers were -to be -commissioned by the governor. It had no stock nor
subscription by its members, and its property was such as was acquired
by donation. The only compensation of the members was relief from
jury and militia duty. A member died, and some fifteen years there-
after, there having been no administration, there was a fund arising
from the sale of property of the company in which his heirs claimed an
interest, and to assert which they filed their bill. Held, that they bad
no right to participate in the fund, either during the existence of the
corporation, or after its dissolution: Mason v. Atlauta Fire Co., 65 or
66 Ga.
Corporation defacto-Estoppel-Incorporation of ra'ding Company
-Liabiltfor Existing Debts.-Where parties commenced and carried
on business as a corporation de facto, and held themselves out to the
world as such, and in that name and character obtained credit, they
3vere estopped from denying such character and name, especially after
judgment had been rendered against them: Georgia Ice o. v. Por-
ter, 65 or 66 Ga.
The conversion of a trading company, acting as a corporation defacto,
into one de jure, will not exempt the property held in the latter
character from liability to the obligations of the former : 1d.
COVENANT.
Against Encumbrances-Breach of-Building Restrictions.-A con-
veyance of a lot of land was subject to the "conditions," that " no
dwelling-house or other, building, except necessary out-buildings, shall
be erected or placed on the rear of the said lot," and that " no build-
ings which may be erected on the said lot shall be less than three stories
in height, exclusive of the basement and attic, nor have exterior walls
of any other material than brick, stone or iron, nor be used or occupied
for any other purpose or in any other way than as a dwelling-house for
the term of twenty years" from a certain day. Held, that these were
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to be construed as restrictions, and not as conditions, and constituted a
breach of a covenant against encumbrances in a subsequent deed:
Ayling v. Kramer, 133 Mass.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Punishment-Fine and mtprisonment.-When the accused is pro-
perly convicted, it is the duty of the court to " pronounce the judgment
provided by law," and a judgment imposing a greater or less fine or
imprisonment than the statute prescribes, may be reversed ; but where
a statute provides for both fine and imprisonment, and one of the
penalties is omitted, the error will not afford ground of reversal, if the
punishment imposed is authorized by the act: Dillon v. State, 38 or 39
Ohio St.
Keeping open Tippling House on Sunday.-It makes no difference in
law whether a place be called a bar-room, a glee club, a parlor, or a
restaurant; if it be a place where liquor is retailed and tippled on the
Sabbath day, with a door for entrance, so that anybody can push it open
enter and drink, the proprietor is guilty of keeping open a tippling
house on Sunday. Nor does it matter whether the drinking be done
standing or sitting, whether at the bar or around a table. In either
event it is tippling, and the pace where it is done is a tippling house:
H ussey v. State, 65 or 66 Ga.
DAMAGES.
Mleasure of, for Timber cuit and carried away..I- an action for
timber cut and carried away from the land of the plaintiff, the measure
of damages is : 1. Where the defendant is a wilful trespasser, the Ill
value of the property at the time and place of demand or, of suit
brought, with no deduction for labor and expense of the defendant; 2.
Where the defendant is an unintentional or mistaken trespasser, or his
innocent vendee, the value at the time of conversion, less what the labor
and expense of defendant and his vendor have added to its value ;
3. Where defendant is a purchaser without notice of wrong from a
wilful trespasser, the value at the time of such purchase : Wooden Ware
Company v. The United States, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
For Ejectment front Car-Arrest for evading Fare-llness from
Improper Treatment by Police Officers.-At the trial of an action of
contract for a breach of the agreement of a railroad corporation to
carry the plaintiff as a passenger on its railroad from S. to N., it appeared
that he bought a ticket at S. which entitled him to be carried to N. ;
that the defendant's conductor refused to receive the ticket, and, when
the train arrived at an intermediate station, the conductor, who was a
railroad police officer, arrested the plaintiff for evading his fare, and
delivered him into the custody of two police officers, who detained him
during the night in the place provided for arrested persons. Held, that
the detention of the plaintiff during the night, his discomforts in the
place of detention, illness produced by the dampness of the cell in
which he was confined, and the indignities which he suffered at the
hands of the police officers, were not elements of damage, which he
could recover in this action: Murdock v. Boston and Albany Railroad,
133 Mass.
VOL. XX:X-28
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DE3TOR AND CREDITOR.
Conveyance- Consideraton.-A conveyance by an insolvent father-
in-law made to his daughter-in-law, in consideration of amounts received
and owing by him as her guardian, is valid; and his creditors can not
force him to set off amounts furnished by him for the maintenance and
support of her and her husband: Comfort v. Bearden, 10 Lea.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES.
Trust-Fraudulent Receipt of Moneys by Legate--Deduction from
subseguent Tnc/e.-If a person, who is a legatee and also cestui gue
trust under a will, fraudulently receives from the executor of, and
trustee under, the will, property which forms part of the principal of
the trust fund, and converts it to his own use, a person subsequently
appointed trustee may retain, out of the income afterwards coming to
the cestui que trust, the amount so converted : C'ocker v. Dillon,
133 Mass.
EQUITY. See Partition.
EVIDENCE.
Witness- One of two Joint Defendants-Evidence as to lnterest.-If,
in an action of tort against two defendants, one of the defendants calls
the other as a witness, he cannot, before the credibility of the witness
has been attacked by the plaintiff, put in evidence for the purpose of
sustaining the testimony of the witness, that the witness was without
any means to satisfy any judgment that nlight be obtained against him:
Bryant v. Zidgewell, 133 Mass
EXECUTION.
Levy on Real Estate.-No entry by the sheriff upon real estate is
necessary to constitute a valid levy thereon: Morgan v. Kinney, 38 or
39 Ohio St.
EXEMPTION. See United States.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT.
Duty of Person making Arrest to convey Prisoner before a Xagis-
trate.-It is the duty of a person making or causing an arrest to be
made, to convey the party arrested without delay before the most con-
venient officer authorized to receive an affidavit and issue a warrant.
This duty is not discharged by delivering the person arrested into the
custody of a police officer, who has no authority to take an affidavit and
issue a warrant. The imprisonment under such an arrest would not be
legal beyond a reasonable time allowed for procuring a warrant; and
what constitutes a reasonable time is a question for the jury: Ocean
Steamship Co. v. Williams, 65 or 66 Ga.
The object of the arrest is to carry the prisoner before a magistrate.
After a warrant has been issued, and the accused has been placed under
arrest, a reasonable time will be allowed by the presiding magistrate for
making an investigation and procuring the evidence in the case: Id.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.
Delay in askingfor Account.-Mere delay of a ward on his arriving
of age to compel his guardian to settle his accounts in the probate
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court, does not discharge the sureties, notwithstanding the guardian
may, in the meantime, have become insolvent: .Newton v. Hammond,
38 or 39 Ohio St.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Conveyance to Married Woman-Agreement to assume .Mortgage.-
The plaintiff held the notes of B., secured by a mortgage on his land.
B. conveyed the land to a married woman, by deed of general warranty,
in consideration of a sum of money paid, and of her accepting a deed
i n which "said grantee assumes * * * as part of the purchase-money,"
said mortgage debt. This was the only separate property she posse.sed.
She conveyed the land to F., and he conveyed to defendants by like
deeds, each containing a stipulation in favor of their grantors that the
grantees assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage debt as part of the
purchase-money. Upon foreclosure and sale, the proceeds were insuffi-
cient to pay the mortgage debt. Held, That, aside from the disability
of coverture, the acceptance by the married woman of the deed from
B., containing the clause, that said grantee assumed as ptart of the pur-
chase-money, the mortgage debt, was an agreement between herself and
her grantor to pay the mortgage debt as part payment of the considera-
tion agreed by her to be given for the land. The transaction was not a
purchase of the equity of redemption, subject to the mortgage, but of
the land in fee, with a stipulation as to the manner in which the .pur-
chase-money agreed upon by the parties should be paid. ,State v. Casey,
38 or 39 Ohio St.
A married woman owning real estate, as her separate property, has
legal capacity, her husband joining, to convey the same to her vdndee,
and she may stipulate for such terms of payment of the purchase-money
as she may think best: Id.
After her conveyance is executed and delivered, her grantee is legally
bound to pay the consideration-money in the manner stipulated, the
same as if she were a feme sole : .d.
The defendants, as grantees of F., having agreed with him to pay
this debt as part payment of the purchase-money, were liable to the
mdirtgagee on such promise, in an action to recover the deficiency : Id.
In such an action by the mortgagee it is a good defence to show that
before the plaintiff has assented to or acted on the promise made in his
favor, the agreement has been rescinded. Id.
Divorce -Custody of Clhildren.- The jurisdiction exercised in a
divorce suit with respect to the custody of children is continuing; the
order in that respect may be modified at any time during the minority
of the children, when their interests may require such modification; and
the reservation of such power in the original order is not essential:
Neil v. Neil, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
Purchase in Wife's Name-Resulting Trust.-When the husband
purchases land and takes title in the name of the wife, the presumption
in the absence of contrary proof, is that the husband intended the land
as a provision for the wife; but this presumption is one of intention
merely, and can be rebutted by any evidence that the husbapd purposed
to retain for himself the beneficial ownership. 'Where the husband, an
illiterate negro, engaged in service at a distance from his wife, sent his
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wages to her with instructions to invest them in a lot, which she pur-
chased and thus paid for, taking title in her own name, it was held
accordingly, upon bill filed by the husband three years after his wife's
death, that he might set up a resulting trust in the lot: Johnson v.
Turner, 10 Lea.
INJTUNOTION.
Representation of Dramatic Work- Copy obtained by Spectator.-
The representation of a dramatic work, which the proprietor has never
caused to be printed and has not obtained a copyright of, if made with-
out license of the proprietor, is a violation of his right, and may be
restrained by injunction, although such representation is from a copy
obtained by a spectator attending a public representation by the proprie-
tor for money, and afterwards writing it from memory: Tompkins v.
.falleck, 133 Mass.
INSURANCE.
Statements il Application-Insertion of by Agent without knowledge of
Insured-Forfeiture.-If an application for a policy of insurance on the
life of a person provides that the representations and apswers made
therein "shall form the basis and become part of the contract of insur-
ance," and "that any untrue answers will render the policy null and
void," and the policy recites that it is issued "in consideration of the
representations and agreements in the application for this policy, which
application is referred to and made a part of this contract," in an action
lipon the policy the application is to be considered a part of the contract,
and if the representations in it are in a material respect untrue, the
action cannot be maintained, although the untrue representations were
inserted in the application by the agent employed by the defendant to
solicit insurance, without the knowledge of the applicant, who orally
stated the truth to the agent: Mc Coy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 133
Mass.
.Aortgagor-Interest not Divested by Irregular Sale.-Where an order
confirming a sale, made under a decree of foreclosure to a mortgagee
who is a party, is at the same term vacated and the sale set aside for
want of notice as required by statute, the insurable interest of the
mortgagor in possession is the same in the property as if such sale and
confirmation had not been made: Richland County Ins. Company v.
Sampson, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
Where a loss to property covered by insurance in favor of the mort-
gagor, occurs after such confirmation and before the order was vacated
and the sale was set aside, the insurable interest, which the mortgagor
in possession had, was not divested by such unauthorized sale and confir-
mation : 1d.
INTOXICATING LIQUOR. See Criminal Law.
MANDAMUS.
City Clerk-Neglect to Advertise under. Ordinance.-Mandamus will
not lie upon.the relation of a citizen and owner of land abutting upon
a street through which a line of railroad authorized by ordinance would
pass if constructed, to compel the city clerk to make the advertisement
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required of him by the ordinance, when he wrongfully refuses or
neglects so to do : State v. Henderson, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
MORTGAGE. See Rusband and Wife.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.
Overdue Coupons of Bonds not .Aatured.-Overdue coupons of munici-
pal bonds which have not matured are negotiable by the law mer-
chant: Town of Thompson v. Perrine, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
PARTITION.
Difference between Partition at Common Law and in Equity- When
Decree for Partition will not be enforced by Decree for Conveyance.-
The difference between a judgment and writ of partition at common law,
and a partition by decree in chancery, as it affects the title, is, that the
former operates by way of delivery of possession and estoppel, while
in the latter, unless otherwise provided by statute, the transfer of the
title caf be effected only by the execution of conveyances between the
parties, which may be decreed by the court and compelled by attach-
ment: Gay v. Parpart, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
Where a decree for partition erroneously declared the nature of the
estate of each co-tenant, and deeds were made three days after which
did not follow this decree, a bill being brought twelve years afterwards
to perfect the partition by compelling conveyances in accordance with
the original decree, Held. that the court could inquire into the equities
of the parties arising out of the surrounding circumstances and refuse
to decree conveyances when inequitable to do so : Id.
If such original decree was made by consent of the party against
whom the error was committed, and without any valuable consideration,
and no one is interested but volunteers, or those who have purchased
with full notice of the facts, no such decree for conveyance will be
made : Id.
PARTNERSHIP.
Liaility of Firm Assets.-The right of partnership creditors to firm
assets is wholly worked out through the equities of the partners; there-
fore, where a surviving partner, with the acquiescence.of the personal
representatives of his deceased partner, and in good faith, carries on the
business and pays debts incurred by him in so doing with the partner-
ship assets in his hands, such disposition of the assets will be valid and
effectual and cannot be treated as a fraud in law upon partnership
creditors: but upon a bill filed by the personal representatives of the
deceased partner or a partnership creditor, he can be compelled to wind
up the firm business and apply its assets to the payment of its debts:
Fitzpatrick v. Flanagan, S. 0. U. S. Oct. Term 1882.
PILOTAGE.
State Law-Requirement that first Pilot offering shall he accepted
-Prior Contract with another Pilot-Sect. 4237, Rev. Stat.-Section
1512 of the Georgia code, providing that any master or commander of
a ship or vessel bearing towards any of the ports or harbors of this state
(except coasters in this state, plying between the ports of this state and
those of South Carolina and Florida) is bound to receive on board the
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first pilot who shall offer his services outside the bar, exhibiting his
license if demanded, and that on refusing so to do, he becomes liable on
arriving in such port to pay the pilot so offering the full rate of pilotage
established by law for such vessel, does not violate art. 4, sect. 2, of the
U. S. Constitution : Thompson v. Spraigue, 65 or 66 Ga.
The exception in favor of coasters between the ports of Georgia and
those of South Carolina and Florida is contrary to section 4237 U. S.
Rev. Stat., and annulled by it, except as to those ports situated upon
waters which are the boundary between Georgia and those states. As
to these, the master of a vessel may employ any pilot licensed or author-
ized by the laws of either state: d.
That such exception of the Code in favor of certain vessels is repug-
nant to the statute of the United States annuls such exception, but
does not invalidate the remainder of the section, the objectionable part
being separable from the balance: Id.
A prior contract between the master or commander of a vessel and
another pilot to receive him on board at a point nearer the bar, will not
give the right to reject the pilot first offering without becoming respon-
sible for his fees under section 1512 : Id.
RIAILROAD.
Power to Purchase Road.-When a railroad company has the right
of constructing a particular line of railroad, with general power to pur-
chase all kinds of property, it may purchase from another company a
road constructed upon that line, if the latter company had power to sell
and dispose of the same: Branch v. Jesup, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
SALE. See Vendor and Vendee.
STATUTE.
Penal Ordinance- General Words- Constrution.-Where an act is
made punishable by fine and imprisonment, the words in which the
offence is defined and punishment prescribed must be strictly construed,
whether they are found in a statute, or an ordinance, or by-law: Shultz
v. Inco:porated Village of Cambridge, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
General words, following particular and specific words, must, as a
general rule, be confined to things of the same kind as those specified : Id.
In an ordinance prohibiting saloon-keepers from permitting at, in or
about the doors, windows, openings, or in the interior of their saloons,
" any blind, screen, painted or frosted glass, shade, curtain or other
device," the words "other device" do not embrace a board partition
beteen different rooms of a building, such partition extending from floor
to ceiling, fastened in the usual manner, and intended by the owner,
when he placed it in the building, as a permanent accession to the
realty: Id.
TRIAL.
Special Verdict-Necessit of the Submission of all Material -Issues
to the Jury.-The court propounded to the jury certain questions, cover-
ing only a part of the material issues of fact. These and the answers
were returned as a special verdict. There was no general verdict, nor
was there a bill of exceptions showing the evidence adduced. The
judgment recited that it was rendered against the defendants "upon
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the special verdict of the jury, and facts credited or not disputed
upon the trial." Held, As the facts set out in the special verdict were
insufficient to sustain the judgment, and as, without a waiver of trial by
jury-against which every reasonable presumption should be indulged-
it was the constitutional right of the defendants to have the jury pass
upon all the material facts in issue; the judgment must be reversed and
a new trial had: Hodges v. Easton, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
UNITED STATES.
When Debtor entitled to Exemption as against-ect. 716 and 916
lReo. Stat.-In case of executions upon judgments in civil actions, the
United States are subject to the same exemptions as apply to private
persons: Fink v. O'Neil, S. C. U. S., Out. Term 1882.
UNITED STATES COUNTS. See Common Carrier.
Jurisdiction- Who " Assignee" within the Act of March 3d 1875.-
The owner of coupons payable to the holder thereof, is not an assignee
within the meaning of the Act of March 3d 1875, and therefore his
right of suit in the federal court does not depend upon the citizenship
of any previous holder: Town of Thompson v. Perrine, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1882.
Suit collusively brought to confer Jurisdition-Act of March 3d
1875.-A Michigan corporation needing to sue the city of Detroit,
local prejudice was feared, and the directors refused to institute pro-
ceedings, and thereupon a stockholder and director residing in New
York, brought suit in the U. S. Circuit Court. Held, That the cir-
cumstances showed that the refusal of the directors was given in order
that this suit might be instituted, and that the same must be dismissed
as being within the purview if not the letter of section 5 of the Act of
March 3d 1875: City of Detroit v. Dean, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.
General Warranty-M11ortgage of Record.-One who purchases land,
receiving a deed of general warranty, without knowledge of a mortgage
theretofore made by his grantor, but which mortgage was duly recorded,
acquires no greater estate than an equity of redemption, notwitbstand-
ing-the fact that the mortgagee from time to time, for a valuable con-
sideration, after the purchase, extended the time of payment of the debt
secured until the mortgagor becomes insolvent: .Kuhns v. AcGeah, 38
or 39 Ohio St.
Rescission-Fraud- Gross inadequacy of Price.-Upon a bill for
rescission of a sale of land, alleging that the vendor falsely represented
it contained valuable iron-ore, which was, in fact, worthless, the defend-
ant denied upon oath that such representation was made ; but the Court,
upon proof that complainant purchased the land fbr the purpose of min-
ing the ore, that the ore was valueless, that the purchase price was
$2500 and the land worth only $250, declared the inadequacy so gross
as to amount to fraud and rescinded the sale : Beac am v. Reagan, 10
Lea.
WATER ,AND WATERCOURSES.
Right to change Channel.-A person owning land abutting on a river
